But try telling the U.S. public. The Journal of Conflict Resolution has just published an article titled Norms, Diplomatic Alternatives, and the Social Psychology of War Support, by Aaron M. Hoffman, Christopher R.

Agnew, Laura E. VanderDrift, and Robert Kulzick. The authors discuss various factors in public support for or opposition to wars, including the prominent place held by the question of success—now generally believed to matter more than body counts (meaning U.S. body counts, the massively larger foreign body counts never even coming into consideration in any study I've heard of). Success is a bizarre factor because of its lack of a hard definition and because by any definition the United States military just doesn't have successes once it moves beyond destroying things to attempts at occupation, control, and long-term exploitation—er, excuse me, democracy promotion.

The authors' own research finds that even when success is believed likely, even the muddle-headed people holding that belief tend to prefer diplomatic options (unless, of course, they are members of the United States Congress). The journal article offers some recent examples beyond the new research to back up its idea: "In 2002–2003, for instance, 60 percent of Americans believed that a US military victory in Iraq was likely (CNN/Time poll, November 13?14, 2002). Nevertheless, 63 percent of the public said they preferred a diplomatic solution to the crisis over a military one (CBS News poll, January 46, 2003)."  But if nobody mentions nonviolent alternatives, people aren't uninterested in them or dismissive of them or opposed to them. No, in large numbers people actually believe that all diplomatic solutions have already been attempted. What a fantastic fact! Of course, it's not that shocking given that war supporters habitually claim to be pursuing war as a last resort and to be fighting war reluctantly in the name of peace. But it's an insane belief to hold if you're living in the real world in which the State Department has become a minor unpaid intern to the Pentagon master.

Diplomacy with some countries, like Iran, has actually been forbidden during periods in in which the U.S. public apparently thought it was being thoroughly pursued. And what in the world would it mean for ALL nonviolent solutions to have been tried? Could one not always think of another? Or try the same one again? Unless a looming emergency like the fictional threat to Benghazi can impose a deadline, the mad rush to war is unjustified by anything rational at all.

The role that the researchers attribute to a belief that diplomacy has already been tried could also be played by a belief that diplomacy is impossible with irrational subhuman monsters like ________ (fill in the government or residents of a targeted nation or region). The difference made by informing someone that alternatives exist would then include in it the transformation of monsters into people capable of speech.

The same transformation might be played by the revelation that, for example, people accused of building nuclear weapons aren't actually doing so. The authors note that: "average support for the use of force by the U.S. military against Iran between 2003 and 2012 appears to be sensitive to information about the quality of available alternative courses of action. Although the use of force was never sup- ported by a majority of Americans during George W. Bush's presidency (2001–2009), it is notable that a significant drop in support for military action against Iran occurs in 2007. At that time, the Bush administration was seen as committed to war with Iran and pursuing diplomatic action half-heartedly. Seymour M. Hersh's article in The New Yorker (2006) reporting that the administration was devising an aerial bombing campaign of suspected nuclear sites in Iran helped confirm this sense. Yet, a release of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which concluded that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 because of international pressure, undercut the argument for war. As an aide to Vice President Dick Cheney told The Wall Street Journal, the authors of the NIE "knew how to pull the rug out from under us".?  But the lesson learned never seems to be that the government wants war and will lie to get it. "While public support for military operations against Iran declined during the Bush administration, it generally increased during President Barack Obama's first term (2009–2012). Obama came to office more optimistic than his predecessor about the ability of diplomacy to get Iran to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Obama, for example, opened the door to direct talks with Iran over its nuclear program —without preconditions,—a position George Bush rejected. Nevertheless, the inefficacy of diplomacy during Obama's first term appears to be associated with gradual acceptance that military action might be the last viable option capable of getting Iran to change course. Paraphrasing former CIA director Michael Hayden, military action against Iran is an increasingly attractive option because "no matter what the U.S. does diplomatically, Tehran keeps pushing ahead with its suspected nuclear program" (Haaretz, July 25, 2010)."  Now how does one keep pushing ahead with something that a foreign government persists in wrongly suspecting or pretending that one is doing? That's never made clear. The point is that if you declare, Bushlike, that you have no use for diplomacy, people will oppose your war initiative. If, on the other hand, you claim, Obamalike, to be pursuing diplomacy, yet you persist, also Obamalike, in promoting the lies about what the targeted nation is up to, then people will apparently feel that they can support mass murder with a clear conscience.

The lesson for opponents of war seems to be this: point out the alternatives. Name the 86 good ideas you have for what to do about ISIS.

Hammer away at what should be done. And some people, though generally accepting of war, will withhold their approval.

Thanks to Patrick Hiller for letting me know about this article.